UNHCR Documents
- UNHCR, ‘Note on Burden and Standard of Proof in Refugee Claims’, 16 December 1998.
Soft Law
- UNHCR, ‘Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees’, HCR/IP/4/Rev.1, 1979, para. 195–205.
Readings
Core
- G. Goodwin-Gill and J. McAdam, The Refugee in International Law, 3rd edn, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 53–60. [G. Goodwin-Gill, The Refugee in International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 34–40.]
- J. Hathaway & M. Foster, The Law of Refugee Status, 2nd edition, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp. 110-122.
Cases
- Chan Yee Kin v. Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs; Soo Cheng Lee v. Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs; Kelly Kar Chun Chan v. Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs,Australia: High Court, 12 September 1989 (Australian judicial decision stating that there should be a ‘real chance’ of persecution if the applicant will be returned to the country of origin, and that the ‘real chance’ standard can be a less than fifty percent probability.)
- R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex parte Sivakumaran and Conjoined Appeals (UNHCR Intervening), [1988] AC 958, [1988] 1 All ER 193, [1988] 2 WLR 92, [1988] Imm AR 147, United Kingdom: House of Lords (Judicial Committee), 16 December 1987 (UK judicial decision setting up the standard of proof in asylum cases as ’a reasonable degree of likelyhood’.)
- INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca 480 US 421 (1987). (US judicial decision stating that one in ten probability of harm can constitute well-founded fear).
- Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Stevic, [1984]467 US 407, The Supreme Court of the United States (US judicial decision stating that a noncitizen who establishes a ‘clear probability’ of persecution cannot be removed, even though denied asylum).
- Fernandez v. Government of Singapore and Others, United Kingdom: House of Lords (Judicial Committee), 25 May 1971 (UK judicial decision stating that the application of ‘balance of probabilities’ standard in proceedings challenging the legality of extradition is not appropriate. Instead, the Court suggested that more favorable standard should be applied in relation to claims of the fugitive, e.g. ‘ a reasonable chance’, ‘serious possibility’ or ‘substantial grounds for thinking’.)